present" (Smith 2009 ), Anthony Smith argues that the symbolic reservoir such as the "myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages" (Smith 1999: 9) which the nationalists utilized also had an impact on the modalities of the "national panorama". Hence, the "historical backgrounds" enjoy contingent power to shape "today", not via path dependencies but via their contributions to the molding of historical and national imaginations.
2
This article will examine the employment of some historical references, namely the Seljuks of Rum and the Battle of Manzikert, one of the most celebrated episodes of Turkic history that heralded the Turkification of Anatolia, in the construction of alternative and conflicting national imaginations. It will discuss the historiography of the Seljuks of Rum as it emerged in the early 20 th century and developed in the republican era as a national icon and show how the Seljuk polity was juxtaposed with contesting national imaginations, thus providing an arsenal of arguments for alternative claims to Turkic history. There is no one single trajectory of Turkish nationalism, but contesting and even contradicting visions of national identity and awareness which have been projected onto the imagined pasts. Thus, a critical engagement with the (inevitably nationalist) Turkish historiography reveals the modifications, transformations and continuities of Turkish nationalism from the late Ottoman Empire, when nationalism was blended with imperial and confessional identities and loyalties, to the staunchly secular and radically modern republican Kemalist nationalism.
3
The article will observe the development of a national-historical imagination in its making. Rather than discuss the development of the historiography of the Seljuks of Rum as an academic field, it will scrutinize what meanings and symbolisms were attributed to the Seljuks of Rum at different historical moments by actors motivated by different political and ideological convictions. It will discuss the representations of certain historical conjectures germane to the agendas of the late Ottoman-Turkish intelligentsia and attest the contours and premises of the late Ottoman-Turkish historiographical visions. By revealing the diverse and sometimes contradictory premises and agendas of Turkish nationalist discourses, the article will also demonstrate the complicated and multilayered nature of the modern Turkish national imaginations as they were revealed in different historical imaginations. Demonstrating the continuities and discontinuities from the late-Ottoman historical imaginations to the Kemalist historical visions allow me to elaborate on the Smithian claim that historical backgrounds have a contingent relationship to the present.
Seljuks as the Precursors of the Ottomans 4
Anatolia between the Turkish invasions and the Ottoman era was almost a terra incognita for the historians at the beginning of the 20 th century. The imposing presence of the Ottomans through six centuries all but obliterated Anatolia's earlier history and rendered it irrelevant and unattractive in the eyes of scholars. This did not stem from the deliberate Ottoman neglect of the Seljuks, as might be expected. The Ottomans themselves did not omit the Seljuks of Rum. On the contrary, the Ottoman tradition (as conveyed extensively in Neşri, (Neşri 1949: 55-71) Ibn-i Kemal, (Ibn-i Kemal 1970:26) Aşıkpaşazade, (Aşıkpaşazade 2003: 321-323) and in other Ottoman chronicles (Oruç Beğ 2007: 3-10) based the legitimacy of the the Ottoman dynastic leadership on the claim that it succeeded the sultans in Konya (and the earlier Turkic dynasties). This halo of legitimacy was supposedly transmitted to the Ottomans thanks to the loyalty and deference shown by Ertuğrul Gazi and Osman Gazi to the Seljuks and the reciprocal support and encouragement the Seljuks gave to the minor Ottoman frontier principality. Although this perception was most overt in Neşri's Cihan-nüma, in which long passages were devoted to the exploits of the pre-Ottoman Turkic polities establishing a linear trajectory from the pre-Islamic Turkic polities to the Ottomans via the Seljuks and the Seljuks of Rum, (Neşri 1949: 2-69) it was not unique to Neşri. The narrative was present in the other Ottoman accounts to varying degrees. A forged imperial edict from the Seljuk sultan Alaeddin to Osman Gazi was included in Feridun Bey's 16 th century Münşeat-ül Salatin in order to demonstrate the transmission of legitimacy from the Seljuks to the Ottomans (Danişmend 1971:3; Yinanç 1924: 216-226 ) alongside another forged Seljuk decree which bestowed the lands in the frontier areas to Osman Gazi (Danişmend 1971: 4) . This mode of legitimacy was apparently imbued with Turkic overtones (as well as Islamic connotations), arguably a derivation of the Turkic political culture in which one khan could legitimately overwhelm the steppes and subdue others. This tradition and its Turkic overtones was modified and further reinvigorated in the 19 th century with the emergence of a modern national consciousness among the Ottoman intelligentsia.
5
In Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's (1822-1895) History, the monumental study that reconciles the reforming Ottoman Empire of the 19 th century with its Ottoman and Islamic heritage, 1 the link between the Ottoman principality and the Iconium sultans of Rum was established as follows: "Although the Iconium sultans of Rum had been one of the strongest polities in the abode of Islam, they were weakened by the Tartars. They even had to pay tribute to the Tartars. After years of disorder and difficulties, this polity waned and was subsequently demolished in the year 699 (A.H.) [1299 A.D.] At that time, thanks to God, the dark beginning's happy conclusion and nightmarish dreams' optimistic interpretation, the Ottomans rose and gave light to all the Islamic lands and the neighboring lands" (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa 1309: v. I, 29) . Ahmed Cevdet Pasha reiterated the Ottoman narrative and maintained that the drum and the tail, the two Turkic symbols of sovereignty and authority, had been dispatched to the young Osman from the sultan in Konya after his victory against the Greeks, epitomizing the transfer of the mandate to govern the Muslims and Turks from the Konya sultanate to the young Osman.
6
Ahmed Vefik Pasha (1823-1891), another Tanzimat statesman and polymath, also contrasted the deference of Osman Bey with the opportunism of the other Turcoman warlords by underlining that after Osman Bey conquered castles in the frontier areas, the drum and the tail were dispatched from Konya (Ahmed Vefik Paşa 1286: 1-2) at a time when disloyal Seljuk governors were striving for independence (dava-yı istiklale düşüyorlar ) (Ahmed Vefik Paşa 1286: 3). Ahmed Rasim (1864 Rasim ( -1932 , in his popular history of the Ottoman Empire, not only highlighted the loyalty of Osman Gazi to the Seljuk sultans at a time when Tartars were attacking the Seljuks and disloyal governors were betraying them in an attempt to benefit from the chaos, but also conveyed an account (taken from Neşri) in which Ertuğrul Bey heroically saved defeated Seljuk soldiers from the Tartar menace, enhancing the confidence of the Seljuk sultan in Ertuğrul Bey (Ahmed Rasim 1326 -1328 . In a similar vein, Ali Seydi (1870 Seydi ( -1933 , the author of numerous Ottoman school textbooks, regarded the Ottoman principality as the "heir and successor" [varis ve halefi] to the Seljuks of Rum and noted that the Ottoman principality proclaimed its independence only after the dissolution of the Seljuk polity (Ali Seydi 1329: 12) . All these late Ottoman intellectuals and historians reiterated the traditional Ottoman narrative in articulating that the frontier territories were bestowed upon the house of Osman by the Seljuks of Rum to fight the Greeks, thus establishing a lineage of legitimacy [kut] transferred from the Seljuks to the Ottomans.
7
Although this tradition was not dismissive of the pre-Ottoman Turkic and Islamic heritage, it employed the Turkic heritage primarily in order to legitimize the rule of the Ottoman dynasty. As David Kushner has demonstrated, there was already a growing interest in both Islamic and pre-Islamic Turkic history during the Hamidian era, an interest apparent in the daily newspaper Ikdam, which endorsed the motto Türk Gazetesidir (A Turkish daily) (Kushner 1977) 2 As an example of the swelling interest in the pre-Ottoman Turks and the positioning of the Ottoman Empire within this glorious past, the prolific writer Ahmed Midhat Efendi (1844 Efendi ( -1912 pointed out in his 1887 world history that "the millions of Turks whom Seljuks brought and settled in these areas mixed with the Ottomans and increased their numbers. If they had not existed, and the Ottoman state had to be founded in the midst of Greeks, Kurds, Arabs and Georgians, these nomads [the Ottomans], only four hundred in number, would not have been able to assert themselves" (Ahmed Midhat Efendi, 1303: v. I, 135; quoted in Kushner 1977: 35) .
8
The historical Turkish identity was explored in the late 19 th century, and its scope was so much expanded that as early as 1869 the Polish convert Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha declared that the Etruscans were Turkish (Copeaux 1997: 17) . Diverse figures such as the eccentric Young Ottoman Ali Suavi (1838-1878), the polymath Ahmed Vefik Pasha (1823-1891), and the military commander Süleyman Pasha (1838-1892) showed a profound interest in pre-Islamic Turkic history. The modes of dynastic legitimacy and the functions and meanings of dynastic governance were also changing. Abdülhamid "invented" new modes of legitimization by popularizing and nationalizing the dynastic legitimacy (Deringil 1998) . Nevertheless, it was the impact of 1908 Revolution that caused these undercurrents to proliferate in the public sphere and to be endorsed by a broader intellectual public. The earlier Turkists 3 of the Hamidian imperial elite seemed outmoded in light of the visions of Ottoman imperialism among the radical Young Turks. For them, the dynastic legitimacy had to be established in accordance with national aspirations and had to be based on national modes of legitimacy. The dynasty should serve the nation, not the other way around. The changing parameters of imperial legitimacy prompted renewed interest in the Seljuks, who were no more perceived as merely a prelude to Ottoman history, but as a pivotal and indispensable chain in Turkic history culminating in the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, Necib Asım and Mehmed Arif, in the first volume of Osmanlı Tarihi [History of the Ottoman Empire] written for the collective project of the Ottoman Historical Association, epitomized the shift in the historical meaning of the Ottoman polity at its best (Necib Asım, Mehmed Arif 1340). Almost the entire volume was devoted to pre-Ottoman Turkic history, beginning with the numerous pre-Islamic and Islamic Turkic polities in Central Asia and ending with an extensive discussion of the Seljuks of Rum. By thus placing the Seljuks within the broader Turkic history, the Ottoman Empire began to be treated not as the natural and preordained end of this trajectory, but as the contemporary Turkic polity, merely another chain in a sequence.
Encümeni [Ottoman Historical Association] was founded by prominent intellectuals of the Hamidian era, including the early Turkist Necib Asım (Akbayrak 2009). New intellectual milieus imbued with new historical visions emerged around nationalist journals such as Türk Yurdu and Halka Doğru, in which numerous stimulating articles were published on Turkish history, archeology, literature, and sociology from the early 1910s onward (Berktay 1983a (Berktay : 2459 . In the Milli Tetebbüler Mecmuası [National Journal of Research], Turkist historians pursued new historical curiosities, first and foremost pre-Ottoman Turkic history. Dynastic historiography centered upon the Ottomans was transformed. In 1913 Yusuf Akçura ferociously criticized Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni by arguing that the association only drew attention to great men, sultans, pashas, and beys without providing any analytical framework, and that it ignored socio-economic backgrounds (Georgeon 1996: 72-76) . Turkist intellectuals such as Akçura focused on grander themes in history and dismissed political history as detail -an Annales paradigm embedded within Turkish nationalism. , the Swiss Max Von Berchem , and the Dutch Martijn Theodoor Houtsma , who compiled epigraphic evidence such as vakfiyes and manuscripts in the libraries of provincial Anatolia (Gordlevsky 1988: 22-25) . Following these pioneers, Western scholars such as Paul Wittek, Friedrich Giese, and Julius Löytved published new epigraphs from the provincial cities and towns (Köprülü 1943: 380) . Inspired by this European interest, a new curiosity flourished in the Ottoman Empire. After 1908 , Halil Edhem (1861 -1938 , the pioneer of Ottoman art history, building conservation, numismatics, and museum development, studied Seljuk epigraphs from provincial Anatolia and contributed to the emerging study of the Seljuks of Rum in a sequence of articles in the journal Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası.(Akbayrak 2009: 475-507) . İsmail Galib, his brother and a pioneering numismatist in his own right, studied coins from the Seljuks of Rum and published a catalogue entitled Takvim-i Meskukat-ı Selçukiye (İsmail Galib 1309). Ahmed Tevfik also published a catalogue of old Islamic coins, including coins from the Seljuks of Rum (Meskukat-ı Kadime-i İslamiye Kataloğu) (Köprülü 1943: 379) . Manuscripts were published and serialized in the historical journals. This process was accompanied by a new interest in local histories in the provinces and in the imperial center as Western curiosity was directed towards the "local pasts". Cuinet. These local histories conveyed whatever information could be gathered from sources such as manuscripts unearthed in the local libraries, epigraphic evidence, and compilations of oral traditions. This was yet another instance of the decentralization and the "de-dynasticization" of Turkish history. Historically important cities reclaimed their forgotten grandeur via their monuments and historical heritage including the many Seljuk centers located mainly on the Central Anatolian Plateau (such as Konya, Kayseri, and Aksaray). The imposing and exclusive presence of the Ottoman Empire in the national historical imagination was dissolving.
The Impact of Fuad Köprülü 11 This was the intellectual and political setting in which Fuad Köprülü (1890 Köprülü ( -1966 delved into the study of the Seljuks of Rum. By raising a variety of problematic issues regarding the Seljuks, Köprülü's contribution to the emerging historiography of the Seljuks revolutionized historical scholarship. His disproportionate impact on the historiography recast the representations of the Seljuk polity within the national imagination, and hence has to be treated separately and extensively. 12 Despite the emerging new interest in pre-Ottoman Anatolia, at the time Köprülü entered the scene it was an almost "blank sheet," not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in Europe, where the output of 19 th -century orientalism was immense in other areas.
5
At the time, not much was known about the Seljuks of Rum, and the lack of critical studies caused prominent scholars to accept as true erroneous ideas such as the perception of the reign of Alaeddin Keykubad III as the age of Seljuk collapse or the supposed association of Bektashis with Mevlevis (Berktay 1983b: 17-19) . The German Orientalist Martin Hartmann spoke of the rule of the Seljuks of Rum in Anatolia as "a period of disorder" without any substantial evidence. Wittek remarked that not much was known regarding the Seljuks of Rum and regarded this period as merely an "auxiliary area" to assist the "main areas of study" (Gordlevsky 1988: 35) . Herbert Adams Gibbons in his 1916 Foundation of the Ottoman Empire ignored the pre-history of the Ottoman Empire and began his history with a chapter entitled "A New Race Appears in History" (Gibbons 1916: 11) in which he mentioned the Seljuks of Rum only in passing. His only commentary regarding the previous two centuries was that Byzantium was too weak to respond to the Turkish invasions and thus was confined to the environs of Constantinople in Western Anatolia (Gibbons 1916: 16-17) . When the young Indologist Franz Babinger at the University of Munich decided to change fields and embark on Turkish studies after working as a liaison officer in the Ottoman army during World War I, the German orientalist G. H. Becker "cautioned him about his views saying that from the standpoint of academic advancement, they [Turkish studies] were a 'sheer catastrophe'. There was no future in Turkish studies" (Leiser 1993: xiv) . 13 The 1910s was a revolutionary decade for the study of Turkic history in the Ottoman Empire. Accompanying many unscientific articles imbued with nationalist fervor, a few exceptional and insightful works were also produced. The studies published in the Ottoman journals were awash with phrases such as "the pathbreaking developments of the last six-seven years" and "impressive works in the last six-seven years" celebrating the new dynamism in the field of 'Turcology,' a new term that began to be used to refer to studies of Turkic history. One of the objectives of Fuad Köprülü and the new nationallyminded generation was rectifying the "biased" studies appearing in Europe that downplayed the "historic greatness" of Turks, and restoring the rightful position of Turks in history. Turks needed to be saved from the unfavorable image they were given because of their contemporary backwardness vis-a-vis Europe.
Turks were not capable of founding and governing such an empire (Gibbons 1916 (Köprülü 1986: 18-19 He connected the historical trajectory of the Turks from Central Asia to Anatolia via the wandering dervishes. It was as if these wandering dervishes and the mystical brotherhoods and networks had assumed the duty to transmit the spirit of Turkishness through their souls from Central Asia to Anatolia and from an earlier age to the Islamic medieval age.
21 Throughout this study, Köprülü consciously overlooked and trivialized political organizations and structures. For him, political structures and political developments were mere superstructures determined by the contours of national cultures and civilizations. What he found in pre-Ottoman and Seljuk Anatolia was the unmediated manifestation of Turkish spirituality and the "spirit of Turkishness" which could be exposed and revealed without a political organization imposing its legalism and ideology. Seljukid Anatolia was praised as the lost utopia of Turkish Islam, uncorrupted by Persian and Arabic influences. He stipulated that "while the nomadic Turcomans were being artistically inspired with the heritage of the Saga of Oghuz Khan and the [Turkish] popular literature, … in the cities, which overflowed with Islamic scholars and jurists, Persian literature reigned … and this culture became so prominent that it could eliminate the national religion [of Turks]" (Köprülü 1976: 233) . The Seljukid court was alienated from the masses and was prone to imitate the high Persian culture to disassociate itself from the masses, whom it perceived as ignorant. Persian language and culture dominated the court (Köprülü 1976: 233-234) . Köprülü thus established a dichotomy between the alienated court culture and the genuine national culture of the masses. In short, he exposed the living tradition of Turkish culture in the absence of an imposition from above.
22 There was a growing enthusiasm with an imagined Turkist utopia that had to be revived and redeemed in the 1910s. 9 Köprülü seems to discover his utopia in the Seljukid Anatolia. Nevertheless, Köprülü was not a radical Turkist praising the pure and uncorrupted volkish spirit as opposed to the corrupted court cultures. On the contrary, in many regards he was conservative, dismissing radicals who sought renunciation of the past and endorsement of Central Asian pagan Turkishness. In his later works, he attempted to reconcile his allegiance to an Ottoman vision by revealing the extent to which Turkish culture survived the Ottoman centuries in Anatolia In this article, he retained the perspective developed in his book Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar. He criticized Babinger's and the Western orientalists' superficiality and ignorance of the local sources and rearticulated his interpretation of Turkish religion in Anatolia. For Köprülü, the Western orientalists' conclusions were erroneous due to their dearth of substantial knowledge and their superficiality. Köprülü's article was a consummate portrayal of his notion of an "organic Islam" in its original and authentic form as it was detached from the scripturalist intepretation and developed by Turks in movement throughout centuries. He endeavored to crush the orientalist vision of a "monolithic Islam" determined by the "book", Islamic learning, and a strict observance of the universally accepted principles and contrasted this legalistic Islam with the Turkish folk Islam with which he was enthralled. 25 Köprülü's work can be regarded as an effort to uncover the "genuine" Turkic history lying dormant beneath the superficial history of wars and dynasties as it was articulated by the Ottoman chroniclers and their modern European followers. Köprülü merged a socio-economic approach with a civilizationist understanding of history. The age of the Seljuks of Rum provided him with a perfect medium to expand on his project. His understanding of the Seljuks of Rum was Janus-faced, directed both to the past and the future. It was both a part of the Anatolian Turkish civilization and a historical juncture at which a Central Asian heritage could be reclaimed for the Turks. It was a historical moment in which the volkisch culture could be easily observed without the veil of political authority influenced by Arabic and Persian high cultures. The history of the Seljuks of Rum was a safe haven for those who were disgruntled with the "chronicler-style history of wars and dynasties". It was a laboratory in which Köprülü constructed a Turkish history from a non-dynastic and non-centrist perspective. As argued above, his shift of interest from literary history to the Seljuks of Rum was no coincidence. He discovered the spirit of Turkishness in a cultural milieu in which the uncorrupted cosmos of Turks reigned before the imposition of a foreign-influenced Ottoman high culture. (Is There a Turkish Public Law Separate from Islamic Public Law?) he described a Turkish legal culture separate and independent from Islamic law, observable from pre-Islamic Turkic times to the Ottoman Empire. In this article, he attempted to demolish the "myth of universal Islamic institutionalism" in favor of a Turkish Sonderweg. Although he acknowledged the significance of Islamic legalism in the Turkish political institutional culture, he argued that legal culture was merely a reflection (or superstructure in Marxian terms) of social formations, thus creating space for the existence of a unique and culturally determined Turkish legal culture. He again drew a trajectory from pre-Islamic Turkic polities to the Ottomans in terms of the character of the political institutions and denied the prominence of Islamic institutionalism and legal culture.
27 In short, the main concern of Köprülü was to draw a trajectory of Turkic history from Central Asia to his own time. 13 He "emancipated" Turkish history not only from Ottoman history, but also from Islamic history. He also set the contours of a future reconciliation with Islam by distinguishing a progressive "Turkish Islam" from the alleged obscurantist Islam. He did not subscribe to the romantic Turan and pre-Ottoman Turcoman principalities, first and foremost the articles of Ahmed Tevfik in the Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası in the 1910s, 15 were followed by new monographs and articles in the 1920s and 1930s as a corollary to the burgeoning interest in local history. Local expressions of ethnic identity appeared not only in national journals such as Belleten and Vakıflar Dergisi but also in the state-sponsored local journals, first and foremost the journals of the local sections of Halkevleri [People's Houses]. 16 New local histories were published (Atalay 1339; Katip Ferdi 1331; Konyalı 1945; Konyalı 1946; Uluçay, Gökçen 1939) . Apparently, these local histories were not regarded as subverting national identity and unity; on the contrary, they were viewed as reinforcing and maintaining the allegiance of localities to the grand national narrative under which they were subsumed. Local historical monuments were perceived as proving the constitutive place of these localities within the grand national narrative. 33 Rendering the Seljuks specifically "Anatolian" conformed to the recently discovered contemporary and republican "Anatolia" (Üstel 1993: 51-55 ). According to Şemseddin Sami's magisterial geographical dictionary published in 1889, Anatolia's southern border lay along the Euphrates between Trebizond in the north and Alexandretta in the south, and its southeastern border was Kurdistan (Şemseddin Sami 1307: v. I, 389) before the term "Anatolia" was reformulated to correspond to all non-European Turkey, "including historical al-Djazira, Kurdistan and Armenia" (Taeschner 1986: v. I, 462) ."In a geography textbook of 1916, Coğrafya-i Osmani (Ottoman Geography), the … territories of the empire were classified under six different regions" (Özkan 2002: 98 ) the first two entries of the list being (1) Anatolia or Asia Minor, and (2) Erzurum and Cezire-i Ulya (Erzurum, Van, Diyarbakır, Hakkari) . In 1918, Fuad Köprülü referred to "Eastern Anatolia" seemingly implying Cezire-i Ulya, while he associated Manzikert with the subsequent Turkish invasion (Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad 1918: 208) . We encounter the first effort to include all of the territories legitimately claimed by Turkey under the rubric of Anatolia in Hamit Sadi's table, which divided Anatolia into nine regions, including "Eastern Anatolia" and "Southeastern Anatolia", to cover the regions previously not included within the geographical region "Anatolia" (Özkan 2002: 99-100) . Although Hamit Sadi's division was reinforced by similar topographical divisions, the old topographical demarcations were yet to be obliterated. Faik Sabri in his 1929 Türkiye Coğrafyası (The Geography of Turkey) was loyal to the historical and geological rationales and divided Turkey into (1) the Thracian Plateau, (2) the Anatolian Plateau (2) the Eastern Plateaus (Şark Yaylaları) (Faik Sabri 1929: 23-60, 96-110, 256-278) . Furthermore, in the official Kemalist history textbook published in 1931, we encounter "Armenia" as a geographical territory which lays west of southern Caucasia and seems to cover modern Turkey's northeast (east of Erzurum) given that the textbook states that in the 11 th century "Armenia was trampled by the Turks. Defeating the Byzantine armies, Turks reached Erzurum" ("Ermenistan Türkler tarafından çiğnendi, Türkler Bizans ordularını mağlup ederek Erzurum'a kadar ilerlediler") (T.T.T. Cemiyeti 1933: 226). The textbook refers to Armenia once more, this time associating the military activity in Armenia with the "destruction of Malatya" (T.T. T. Cemiyeti 1933: 227) . Nevertheless, the rhetoric of "the unity of the Anatolian Turks", which was attained at certain historical junctures (such as the establishment of the Seljuks of Rum, the rise of Ottomans and the defeat of the Greeks, and the end of Greek and Allied occupation in the National Struggle in 1922) and dissolved at other historical junctures, is a key theme in this official textbook (T.T.T. Cemiyeti 1933: 278). 34 The dramatic loss of Roumelia had to be compensated for with a new Anatolian identity.
At this time, it was also rediscovered that it was during the Seljuk rule that Anatolia had been referred to as Turchia by Westerners for the very first time (Cahen 1968: 145) . Furthermore, the overlap between the regions claimed by the Seljuks of Rum and the Turcoman principalities with the newly founded Turkish republic was so striking that it inspired the sentiment that Anatolia was divinely ordained for Turks and that Anatolia was their manifest destiny, a legitimate and historic right that could not be taken away from them. . In the first, chronological part of the book, he summarized political history, whereas in the second part he dealt analytically with the social and economic conditions of the principalities in Anatolia. In this latter part his main concern was clearly to prove and further Köprülü's thesis (Uzunçarşılı 1941 ). Uzunçarşılı's interest in socio-economic history was inspired by Köprülü, but lacking Köprülü's erudition and comparative methodology, Uzunçarşılı was prone to essentialism and legalism and tended to assume that legal institutions on paper both revealed and determined political, social, and economic organization and development.Nevertheless, this study was a major contribution at a time when the Turcoman principalities were a black hole in academia. and also inspired the emerging nationally-minded intelligentsia to endorse it enthusiastically. The akhi institution was praised immensely by the republican intelligentsia, who saw it as epitomizing a Turkic semi-republicanism which apparently enjoyed significant power in cities after the Mongol invasions and the breakdown of political structures. More importantly, Ankara, the capital of the new republic, was supposed to have been a medieval city-state self-governed by the akhis before the Ottoman takeover (Uzunçarşılı 1945: 40-41; Koşay 1932: 22; Gülekli 1948:49; Galanti 1951: 49-50; Ahmed Tevfik 1329 1200 -1204 Halil Edhem 1332: 312-312) . Akhis were examined in various books, articles and pamphlets in the 1940s, some academically robust and others meager propaganda work. Whereas the prolific scholar Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı produced an exhaustive and meticulous study of the akhis, (Gölpınarlı 1949 (Gölpınarlı -1950 ) others, such as İlhan Tarus, perceived them as precursors of the republic who "lived within a democratic system" (Tarus 1947: 45) . Neşet Çağatay tellingly named his book on these fraternities as "Akhis as a Turkish National Institution" (Çağatay 1974 1943: 456) . Kansu then quoted Albert Gabriel, who praised the high standards of Seljuk art and concluded that "far from being followers of a foreign school, the Seljuk art displays such creativity and originality that Turks can see the artistic work of the XII and XIII centuries as a legacy of their magnificent past" (Kansu 1943: 450) . Interpreting Gabriel's commentary on artistic continuity as a proof of "racial continuity", this (pseudo-)scientific anthropological survey "confirmed" that Turks were an autochthonous race that had not arrived in Anatolia later than one thousand years ago, and that Seljuks were merely another Turkish group that reached Anatolia following the migration paths of the earlier Turks (Kansu 1943: 456) .
The Creation of the Myth of Manzikert
38 Manzikert is one of the most commemorated events of Turkic history. Establishing the unique position of the Seljuks of Rum within Turkic history, it was celebrated as the socalled "opening of Anatolia as a homeland (heimat) to Turks" in Turkish nationalist discourse, and eventually became a cliché incorporated into popular discourse as a selfevident truth. The making of the myth of Manzikert and the emotional significance attributed to this battle are worth an examination.
39 At the end of the battle of Mazikert in August 1071, the Byzantine army was severely defeated by the Seljuk army and the Byzantine emperor was captured. Yet Manzikert was not a pre-planned strategic victory for the Seljuks. The Seljuk leader Alparslan did not aim to attack and destroy the ambitious Byzantine army; his attack was rather a defensive measure before moving to his main combat ground in the south to face the Fatimids for supremacy within the abode of Islam at a time when the Byzantine army was striving to impede the continuous Turcoman raids that had been ravaging the eastern frontiers of Byzantium since the 1050s. The conclusive victory also did not cause Alparslan to take advantage of this defeat and seek territorial expansion. As Claude Cahen, the eminent authority on Selkjuks of Rum wrote, "Alp Arslan's object was not to destroy the Byzantine Empire; he contented himself with frontier adjustments, the promise of tribute and an alliance-settlement which the downfall of Romanos Diogenes rendered impermanent" (Cahen 1986: 420-421) . Nevertheless, what followed the war was the rapid Turkification and Islamization of Anatolia. "This was due to the internal political disorders in the Byzantine polity. The domestic conflicts of the Byzantines not only encouraged Turcomans to raid the west of Cappadocia, but also allowed them to take hold and settle in these lands" (Cahen 1992: 26) . The Turkification and Muslimization of Anatolia occurred within two centuries, mainly in two waves: the first in the second half of the 11 th century and the second in the mid-13 th century due to the flight from the Mongols. Thus, Manzikert paved the way for a dramatic process of Turkish colonization and transformed the demography of Anatolia, a process which has yet to be explained satisfactorily in the absence of substantial evidence. The loss of Roumelia in the Balkan Wars inspired a new interest in Anatolia, which was rendered the "homeland of the Turks". It also arguably emerged as a reaction to the utopian Panturkism and visions of mythical Turan, which some regarded as an artificial construct promoted by the Tatar intellectuals who had settled in Istanbul after 1908. In this conjuncture, a new emphasis on Anatolia and a Turkish identity embedded in the Anatolian geography emerged. One exponent of this position was Yahya Kemal (1884-1958). As we learn from Yakup Kadri Karosmanoğlu, in the 1910s Yahya Kemal was contemptuous of the empty rhetoric of the Turanists. Turks of a distant geography and past held no interest for him, and he showed no affinity for pre-Manzikert Turkic history, regarding it, at best, as a prelude to Turkish history (Tanpınar 1995: 33) . Protesting the "crude nationalism" of Ziya Gökalp, he subscribed to a romantic nationalism, and dismissed historical epics with the motto "I am future rooted in the past" (Karaosmanoğlu 2000: 122) . Yahya Kemal articulated his position during the National Struggle in Dergah, a journal published in Istanbul during the Allied occupation (1918) (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) by a group of young intellectuals "who came together not due to close intellectual affinities, but due to the shared trauma of the Balkan Wars and the enthusiasm for the National Struggle" (Tanpınar 1995: 33-34 Hearths by those who defended a Turkish homeland strictly confined to Anatolia (Üstel 1993: 51) .
41 The "myth of Manzikert as the moment of the opening of Anatolia to the Turks" was invented in the early 20 th century within this intellectual milieu to serve these concerns. Although Manzikert was already venerated as a Muslim epic in 19th-century Ottoman historiography, its depiction as the "battle that opened Anatolia to Turks" was novel.
42 Abrurrahman Şeref had mentioned the war as "the war near Manzikert" in which the "Roman emperor Roman Diogenes was defeated and taken captive" without any reference to the "opening of Anatolia" (Abdurrahman 
208) In 1922, he referred to the battle as "the definite victory of Manzikert" in Turkifying Anatolia (Malazgirt zafer-i kat'isi) (Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad 1338: 282). In his 1926
History of Turkish Literature he wrote, "the victory in Manzikert opened all the paths to Anatolia" (Köprülü 1980) . This view became the unquestioned orthodoxy with the Kemalist intervention into Turkish historiography beginning in 1930 (Akbayrak 2009: 368-376; Ersanlı 2003: 119-120; Copeaux 1997: 54-61; İğdemir 1973) . 44 In Mükrimin Halil Yinanç's 1934 History of Turkey: Age of the Seljuks, Manzikert was consecrated not only as the turning point in Turkic history, but also "a turning point in world history" (Yinanç 1944: 78) .Staff officer Feridun Dirimtekin wrote in his "military history" of the Battle of Manzikert published as the supplement of Military Journal in 1936 that "Seljuk commanders conquered Sivas, Kayseri, Bursa, Ankara and the Aegean coasts…Anatolia was Turkified. That meant the end of Byzantium" (Dirimtekin 1936: 48) . 25 He also compared Manzikert with the Battle of Cannae, the decisive defeat of the Roman army by the Carthegian army under Hannibal which was praised by Hans Delbrück, the most reputed German military historian in pre-1914 Germany, Alfred Von Schlieffen, the eminent strategist and chief of the Imperial German General Staff from 1891 to 1906, and the Prussian military historians in general as the ultimate battle of annihilation (and an inspiration for the Schlieffen Plan and Blitzkrieg) and spectacular tactical genius (Dirimtekin 1936: 1) . His comparison and depiction of the war as the "Turkish Battle of Cannae" clearly epitomized the new cultic status of the war in the eyes of the nationalists and Kemalists deeply influenced from Prussian visions of total warfare, militarization of the nation and militarism. Dirimtekin also began his military study of Manzikert rendering it as a "turning point in world history" (Dirimtekin 1936: 1) . The reiteration of this cliché will recur verbatim in all the later treatments of Manzikert (Turan 1971: 32; Sevim 1988: 75; Sevim, Merçil 1995: 72) .
45 Mükrimin Halil Yinanç was one of the proponents of the Anatolian ideology in the 1920s and emerged as a pioneer in the scholarly study of the Seljuks of Rum in Turkey. He gathered and carefully scrutinized manuscripts pertaining to the era in various languages (Ülken 1961; excerpted in Alpayer, Özatalay 1962: 52-53) . In line with the premises of Kemalist historiography, he proposed a radical new historical periodization of Turkish history. He developed his periodization as early as 1924 in an article in the journal Anadolu Mecmuası in which he rendered the six centuries of the Ottoman Empire into a mere phase among others in the history of Anatolian Turkishness (Üstel 1993: 52) . In this later, more scholarly studies, he retained his periodization of the "History of Turkey" [ Türkiye Tarihi] -a phrase introduced by Kemalist historiography -beginning with "the opening of Anatolia by the Turcomans, who were one of the most populous branches of the Turkish race and who deemed it their own land [yurd]" (Yinanç 1944:1) . The first age of Turkey was "the age of establishment, formation, settlement, and unification" which covered the reign of Seljuks of Rum. This was followed by the "age of interregnum and lords of the valley" [fetret veya müluk-i tavaif devri] before the Ottomans reestablished Anatolian and Turkish unity. As is clear from the names given to the eras of Anatolian history, the phrase Türkiye Tarihi marginalized the Ottoman Empire despite its imposing six-century-long presence and rendered it a mere phase of the History of Turkey beginning in 1071, the annus mirabilis of both Turkish history and the history of Turkey. (Hillenbrand 2007: 216-219) . Books were published not only on the Battle of Manzikert but also on the Seljuks of Rum in general, ensuring that 1971 would leave its mark on the historical imagery of the next two decades (Aslanapa et al. 1971; Bilgiç 1971a; Alptekin 1971; Arık 1971; Dilaver 1971) . It was an opportune moment for the battle to appear under the spotlight because it served to demonstrate the historical authenticity of the TurcoIslamic persuasion, although it may be argued that the merging of ecumenic Turkic and Turco-Islamic history with a Kemalist vision of history confined strictly to Anatolia exemplifies the contingent power of history and historical metaphors over contemporary discourses and ideologies. Inspired by the vision of Ziya Gökalp (1876 Gökalp ( -1924 , the revered ideologue of Turkish nationalism and Kemalism, they imagined a "Turkish culture" uncorrupted through the ages and embodied in the Turkic states, and argued that the Turkish nation was grounded in this cultural uniqueness rather than on racial superiority. The culturalistic turn enabled the insertion of religion as one among many other components of Turkish culture. The proponents of the Turco-Islamic synthesis thus endorsed the nation-statist discourse of Kemalism and reconciled it with Islam, merging their Kemalist training in the "center" with their provincial backgrounds. The short biographies of the two architects of this idea are illustrative.
48 İbrahim Kafesoğlu and Osman Turan were both born in 1914, Kafesoğlu in the town of Tefenni in the province of Burdur (Leiser 1988: 13) and Turan in Soğanlı, a village near Trabzon (Demirci 1995: 8) . They both came from rural lower-class families and owed their upward social mobility to their training in the prestigious academic institutions founded by the Kemalist regime in the 1930s to train the new generation of scholars. They acquired their bachelor degrees in Ankara at the newly established Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi [Faculty of Language, History, and Geography] and took over the work of the preceding first generation of Kemalist historians. This geographical and cultural expansion process, whereby country boys were requited, equipped with intellectual capital and utilized to convey the message of Kemalism, widened Kemalism's accessibility and reception. Although the message was significantly modified in certain aspects, the continuities were also remarkable.
49 TKAE (The Institute for Research on Turkish Culture), founded in 1961, became an important site for the development of the Turco-Islamic synthesis (Copeaux 1997: 95-100 one of the foremost historians of the Seljuks, emerged as the chief ideologue of the institute, and endeavored to construct a new historical imagination that would reconcile the Turkish nation and culture with Islam (Kafesoğlu 1955: 463-490; Kafesoğlu 1966: 467-480; Kafesoğlu 1972) . He was not only a prolific writer but also an adroit organizer of symposia and congresses gathering "nationalist intellectuals" (Taşkın 2007: 135-143) . He was also the founder and the first chairman of the "Hearth of the Intellectuals" (Aydınlar Ocağı), a highly influential right-wing think-tank in the 1970s and the chief bastion of the TurcoIslamic Synthesis. 27
50 Interestingly, many of the prominent proponents of the Turco-Islamic persuasion, including İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Osman Turan (1914 Turan ( -1978 28 and Mehmet Altan Köymen (1914 Köymen ( -1993 , (Köymen 1976; Köymen 1989) were scholars of the Seljuks and the Seljuks of Rum, and were at the same time also right-wing intellectuals and leading Seljuk historians. Although they began to produce their early work in the late 1940s and 1950s (Köymen 1947; Turan 1948a; Turan 1948b; Turan 1952; Kafesoğlu 1956; Erzi 1956; Köymen 1962) (Bilgiç 1971b: vi) .
51 As the 900 th anniversary of Manzikert approached, the battle came to the limelight and was further consecrated. In the words of two prominent proponents of the Turco-Islamic synthesis, with Manzikert, "Anatolia's eternal destiny was sealed with its transformation into a Turkish homeland (yurd)" (Kafesoğlu, Deliorman 1977: 66; Sevim 1988: 58-76; Turan 1971: 32-37; Köymen 1992: v. III, 26-40) . Furthermore, these historians gave their own twist to the Kemalist interpretation of Manzikert.
29
52 In one respect, what the Turco-Islamic hagiographers of Manzikert did was simply return to the "origins", discovering the sources and reiterating them verbatim and thus reIslamizing Manzikert after its portrayal in the Kemalist canon as an ethno-racial war. Faruk Sümer and Ali Sevim gathered relevant Islamic sources on Manzikert (Hillenbrand 2007) . Their study included thirteen accounts, including the relevant chapters of Rashidel-Din's Jami-ul-Tawarikh. The thirteen accounts gathered by Sümer and Sevim to a large extent replicated each other. Although none of these sources were contemporary with Manzikert (many of them written one or two centuries later), Cahen noted that the Muslim/Arabic sources regarding Manzikert are in agreement with accounts of the Byzantine commanders who participated in the battle (Cahen 1934 : 617-642 quoted in Copeaux 1997 . The discourse prevalent in these accounts is emblematic of the Islamic gaza literature, juxtaposing upright and victorious Muslims with barbaric infidels. Ibn al-Athir wrote in his al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh, "poets had praised Alp Arslan and repeatedly commemorated this victory" (Sümer 1988: 27) . Likewise, Ibn al-Djawzi wrote "when the news reached Baghdad, drums and horns were played. People gathered in beyt al-nuba.
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The letter of victory was read aloud" (Sümer 1988: 17) . Arguably, Ibn al-Athir's and other authors' accounts derived from these epic oral traditions. These accounts conveyed in detail the spectacular narrative of the captivity of Roman Diogenes and his freeing by the magnanimous Alp Arslan. The most poignant narrative tradition was conveyed in Rashed-din's account.
53 Whether this victory made such an impact in the consciousness of the Muslim public opinion cannot be known. However, one thing is sure: By documenting the contemporary eulogies of the Battle of Manzikert, the proponents of the Turko-Islamic synthesis reconstructed the myth of Manzikert as an Islamic epic. 30 This epic narrative established itself as the only truthful narrative and obliterated any possible alternative narratives of the battle. 31 Hence, in the modern Turco-Islamic narrative of Manzikert, we do not observe any significant historical misrepresentations or distortions. On the contrary, the salient point is the accordance between the discourses of the Islamic contemporary accounts and the modern Turco-Islamic narrative of Manzikert. Providing evidence to Anthony Smith and his ethnosymbolic approach to nationalism (Smith 1991; Smith 1999; Smith 1986; Smith 2003) , the Turco-Islamists reinvigorated the contemporary accounts of the Battle of Manzikert, and out of these popular mythologies, they invented a modern Turco-Islamic imagination and narrative.
54 The prominent role attributed to Manzikert arguably derived from its Janus-faced character. Manzikert contained allusions to a Turkish nationalism both Anatolia-centered and ecumenical. It had two faces, the first directed towards the pre-1071 world of Turks and the other looking at the post-1071 world of "Western Turks" in Anatolia. We may argue that Manzikert was a conspicuously Kemalist project although its heyday came long after Kemal Atatürk with the rise of the historians of the Turco-Islamic synthesis school.
32
Manzikert connected two different Turkic cosmologies and drew a path from the legendary Oghuz Khan (the first Turk and the first Turkish khan in the Turkish mythology) to Atatürk by simultaneously alluding to the ecumenical vision of Turks and to the sacralization of Anatolia. It was the intersection and marriage of two different historical imaginations.
55 The contemporary accounts of the battle were reconstructed through a Kemalist lens which reinterpreted the medieval warfare and statecraft within the terminology of perfectly organized, Weberian, modern nation-states. Etienne Copeaux has demonstrated the extent of the Kemalist elements in this gaza epic narrative introduced in the 1970s as most apparent in the implicit or explicit allusions to Atatürk in the depictions of Alparslan throughout the epic gaza narrative introduced in the 1970s (Copeaux 1997: 191) .
33
The resemblance of the dialogues between the victorious Alparslan and the captive Roman emperor Roman Diogenes to the dialogue between the victorious Mustafa Kemal and the captive Greek commander Trikupis in 1922 are unmistakable. The refashioning of Manzikert in the 1970s marked a perfect moment for the reconciliation of Kemalism and Islamic discourse at a time when the chief enemy of the republic emerged as the communists.
56 The Kemalist narrative was the Ur-ideology and the "root paradigm" of modern Turkish political culture from which all the modern ideologies from socialism to Islamism derived their premises. This is also true for the Kemalist representations of Turkish history. Nevertheless, there are salient differences between the Kemalist and the Turco-Islamic depictions of post-Manzikert and Seljuk Anatolia. Due to lack of space, we will not comparatively scrutinize the scholarly output of these two schools 34 but will instead attempt to reveal the differences as they appear in the history textbooks which, because they were written with pedagogical aims, best exemplify the ideological premises.
57 Tarih II, the authoritative Kemalist high school text book published in 1933,discussed the clashes with Georgians and Armenians during the Turcoman raids into Anatolia (T.T. T. Cemiyeti 1933: 226) . All references to Armenians and Georgians disappeared in the history textbooks of the 1970s, which portrayed these raids as targeting the Byzantine Empire and imagined the Byzantine Empire as a perfectly centralized polity monitored strictly from Constantinople. In Tarih II, by contrast, the fragility and tributary nature of the Byzantine central state was captured well. As articulated in the Kemalist course book, during these raids, the Turcoman lords plundered nearby cities and fought not with the forces of the Byzantine central authority, but with local, autonomous commanders. After the Byzantine military and political presence had been weakened in these remote outposts, the Byzantine East was run by local warlords of predominantly Armenian and Georgian origins. It can be argued that later textbooks ceased to emphasize the Turcoman raids so as not to invoke the non-Turkish autochthonous ethnic groups living in Anatolia prior to Manzikert. In the 1930s, the memories of the ethnically mixed character of Anatolia before the 1920s were fresh, in particular of the Armenians and the Armenian massacres. Time was necessary for the "forgetting process" which formed one of the main components of the "construction of national memory".
35
Furthermore, the consolidation of state-centrism (as opposed to Turkism) had yet to be completed in the 1930s, a period which was marked with inconsistencies and ambiguities.
36
58 We may legitimately argue that in Tarih II, the cult of the state was not yet consolidated.
Instead of portraying the nation as strictly defined by its submission to a political authority that claims to represent it, Tarih II promoted a racialized notion of nation. The image of Turks fighting against and defeating Armenians and Georgians was also arguably in accordance with social Darwinism's understanding of ethnico-racial wars and struggles.
59 The rupture in the representations of nation and state in Turkish history can be observed in the liberal-nationalist history textbooks written in the late 1940s and 1950s by authors such as Emin Oktay and Niyazi Akşit 37 as replacements for the Kemalist history textbooks. In these textbooks, the Seljuk raiders were depicted as modern military commanders taking and executing orders from the central political authority. "Kutulmuş oğlu Süleyman Bey was assigned [memur edildi] to conquer the lands to the west of Kızılırmak." (Oktay 1951: 173) . The book trivialized and marginalized the principalities established by the Turcoman raiders and implied that Kutalmışoğlu Süleyman, by establishing an effective and centralized state in such a short time, secured the "unity of Anatolia" [ Anadolu birliği] , that sacrosanct phrase and cult of Turkish nationalism and nation-statism (Oktay 1951: 173 (Kafesoğlu, Deliorman 1977: 66) . 39 The authors described these marches in detail and dubbed these raids "military operations" (harekat) coordinated by a joint chiefs of staff: Operation Southeastern Anatolia, Operation Western Anatolia, Operation Eastern Anatolia, Operation Middle and Northwestern Anatolia (Kafesoğlu, Deliorman 1977: 68-73; Sevim 1988: 42-45) . According to the textbook, whereas the Seljuks of Rum had been established legitimately upon the orders of Alp Arslan as an extension and dependency of the Seljuks after Manzikert, "the Turcoman principalities were [temporarily] founded due to a power vacuum [iktidar boşluğu]", (Kafesoğlu, Deliorman 1977: 109) as if their establishment was a diversion from the natural path and a temporary stage within the pre-ordained trajectory of (Turkic) history.
61 With the complete victory of the cult of the state over ethnic romanticism, ethnic references were also marginalized, and the narrative was reconstructed as a struggle between the Turkish political leadership and the Byzantine Empire. According to Osman Turan, once the Byzantines had been subdued militarily and politically, Anatolia was easily Turkified and Islamized (Turan 1973: 51) . He saw the Turkish raids as part of a master plan for the Turkish conquest of Anatolia derived from a "Turkish ideal of world domination" [Türk cihan hakimiyeti mefkuresi], the foremost motivation of Turks in history (Turan 1969b) . The Turkish raids and plunders were no longer seen as spontaneous, as had been implied in Tarih II. Now the Turkish race was imagined as an organism with one brain and single command unlike the Kemalist romanticism which had praised the freestanding "noble raiders" fighting for their own glory, fame, and honor although subservient to the Turkic ideal in the final analysis. For Kafesoğlu, Turcoman nomads "came from distant steppes never to return, and submitted to the Seljukid state. Coordinated and guided by the state, they flooded into Byzantium with Islamic zeal and heroism" (Kafesoğlu 1956: 1-2) . Arguably, state-centrism had won over a racialized vision of history, much as it had in the 19 th-century Europe, where romantic nationalism had been absorbed by the rising nation-states, especially in Germany where the early-19 thcentury pre-Christian pagan mythologies had been absorbed by Prussian authoritarianism. 40 Hence, the struggles against the "Armenian and Georgian" were replaced by struggles with the Byzantine Empire. 62 The depiction of the emergence of the first principalities was also different in these history textbooks. Whereas in the coursebooks of the 1970s, the emergence of the principalities founded by the Seljuk raider commanders in post-Manzikert Anatolia (Danişmenids, Artukids etc.) was downplayed and marginalized, in Tarih II the princes were perceived as audacious warlords who had legitimate rights to hold on to their dominions. The raider-commanders were seen as considerably independent authorities. Central authority was yet to be consecrated as indivisible, incorruptible, and the embodiment of Turkishness within a discourse of the "eternal state" [ebed müddet devlet]. According to Tarih II, "the unification [vahdet] of Anatolia had been achieved as late as during the reign of Kılıçarslan II (1156-1192)", (Deliorman 1988: 232) and the era between 1070s and circa 1200s was dubbed "The Era of the First Seljukid Feudalism" (T.T.T. Cemiyeti 1933: 228) . According to the history textbooks of the 1970s, by contrast, the "unity of Anatolia" had been achieved rapidly by Kutalmışoğlu Süleymanşah's defeat of the insurgent but weak commanders who had temporarily succeeded in running their dominions. hierarchical ikta order "decreed" from the top. The dominions of the warlords were granted by the central authority for their military service to the "state", and the warlords were submissive to this centralized and hierarchical political order. This was not the case in Tarih II. Inspired by Köprülü and others, the economic structure was dubbed "feudalism" (or in the favorite phrase of Köprülü, "Turkish medieval feudalism") in which the relative powers of the centrifugal and central forces were determined by their relative military shrewdness, thus recognizing the permanent tension between the raiding commanders and their overlords (Deliorman 1988: 278) . Although Tarih II also accentuated the unity of the Turks under the aegis of one single "civilization" and allencompassing political, economic, and military structure, this unity and centralism was reconciled with the noble raider character of the Turcoman nomads marching across the frontiers. In contrast, in the Turco-Islamic imagination, this organicism was more explicit and any mischief among the Turks was regarded as subversion which could easily be abused and manipulated by the insidious foes of the Turks (Deliorman 1988: 279) .
64 It is also remarkable that whereas Dirimtekin, a representative of the Kemalist paradigm, in 1936 accused Alp Aslan for making a devastating blunder in freeing the Roman emperor and criticized his narrow foresight in his analysis from the perspective of military science, (Dirimtekin 1936: 46 ) the proponents of Turco-Islamic synthesis praised his benevolence, magnanimity and for "showing mercy, moderation and humanitarianism" (Kafesoğlu 1956: 19) which they saw as Turkish and Islamic virtues.
41
Differing attitudes toward Alp Arslan arguably stemmed from the fact that whereas for Dirimtekin it was the Seljukid military commanders and raiders that had epitomized Turkishness, for the proponents of Turco-Islamic synthesis Turkishness was embodied in the person of the sultan. Furthermore, whereas for Dirimtekin, who was enthralled with Prussian militaristic visions, it was the sheer might of the Turks that was to be esteemed, in the upcoming decades it was also the moral righteousness of Turks that had to be cherished and emphasized.
66 Hence, since the idea of a politically divided Anatolia was subversive, its unity had to be secured. The nation was also imagined ahistorically and as an organic whole. Yet the nation was indefinable in the absence of a state. The Turkish nation was to be realized and defined via obedience to a political organization. 68 What is striking is that, after a stagnation in Seljuk studies, it emerged as a popular theme among conservative historians beginning in the 1960s. There were several reasons for this development. One was the relative familiarity of these conservative historians with the prerequisite languages (Arabic and Persian). The ideological reasons also should not be omitted. The ethos of the Islamic worldview, the Islamic ideology of conquest, and the affinities of the Seljuks with Turkic ecumenism via Manzikert animated these historians.
69
The study of the Seljuks of Rum was subsumed under the rubric of the studies of IslamicTurkish states. It was depicted as a crucial phase of the pre-destined Turkish historical trajectory, being the indispensable intermediary sequence duringwhich Anatolia became the homeland for Turks. Nevertheless, it was not deemed as purely an Anatolian phenomenon but analyzed within the ecumenism of Turkishness and the abode of Islam with Manzikert functioning as the critical nexus between the two. It was no coincidence that the Turkish scholars who studied the Seljuks of Rum had also examined other Islamic-Turkic polities (rather than the Ottomans). Hence, the study of the Seljuks of Rum was subsumed under global Turkic history. 
3.
Although the term "Turkish nationalists" could also be used, "Turkist" seems more appropriate to demarcate those who entertained an exclusively ethnic sensitivity and were interested in the pre-Islamic (as well as Islamic) ancient Turkic culture from those who espoused a certain idea of nationhood without necessarily glorifying Turkic ancestry and emphasized a common Muslim bond and a porous political identity built around the Ottoman state.
4.
For a comprehensive account of Köprülü's intellectual biography, see Park 1975 .
5.
For a review of the emergence and development of the scholarship on the Seljuks of Rum from the 1910s to 1930, see Gordlevksy 1988: 11-36 . For the state of the study of Turcoman principalities, see Wittek 1934: vii-xi . Also for a discussion of the emergence of the first scholarly interest in the "rise of the Ottoman state" in the late-13th-and early-14th-century Bithynia in Western Anatolia, see Kafadar 1995: 9-12, 29-44; Berktay 1983b: 17-20; Babinger, Köprülü 2003: 13. 6. For its reprint in the Latin alphabet, see Köprülü 1986: 3-47 . 8. For some vivid narratives of this interpretation of Islam, see Fuad Köprülü (1976:251-253; 349-357) .
9.
For example see the novels of Halide Edib and Müfide Tek (Halide Edib 1329; Müfide Ferit 2002 [1918 ).
10. (Babinger 1338: 188-221) . For the Latin transcription of its Turkish translation, see Babinger and Köprülü (2003: 11-37) .
11.
For the text, see Babinger and Köprülü 2003: 41-122 
24.
Even in 1928, in the yearbook of the Turkish Hearths, the Battle of Manzikert was only briefly mentioned as an event which took place "exactly nine and a half centuries before the last assault of the Greeks on Anatolia",but no name was attributed to the battle (Akçuraoğlu Yusuf 2009: 42). Feridun Dirimtekin, Malazgirt Meydan Muharebesi, 1936, p. 48 . A second edition of the study was published by Ahmet Halit Publishing House seven years later (Dirimtekin 1943) .
25.

26.
For an analysis of Turco-Islamic synthesis, see Taşkın 28. (Turan 1970 : 231-262 ; Turan 1969 ; Turan 1971 ; Turan 1988 ; Turan 1948a ; Turan 1948b ; Turan 1952 ; Turan 1973) . Besides his scholarly work on Seljuks and medieval Turkic history, Turan also authored numerous volumes where he articulated his political views and assailed leftists and "Westerners" whom he accused of being alienated from Turkishness and its spiritual base (Turan 1948c; Turan 1964; Turan 1969b) . 
31.
For an insightful comparative perspective for Manzikert, see George Duby's monumental study of the construction of the myth of the Battle of Bouvines in Capetian France (Duby 1973 ).
32.
For some studies of Manzikert conducted by historians affiliated with the Turco-Islamist school, see Sevim and Sümer 1988; Sümer 1975: 197-207; Sevim 1990; Sevim 1972: 219- Green (2001); for the assessment of this process as a continent-wide phenomenon, see Thom (1995) .
41.
For depiction and praising of Alp Arslan's magnanimity towards Romanos Diogenes, see Turan (1971 29-32) ; Turan (1969 : 140-142) ; Sevim (1988 : 88-91) .
42.
The interpretations of the Seljuks of Rum by Mustafa Akdağ and Doğan Avcıoğlu contrast with the interpretations of conservative historians and also merit a brief treatment, although they need to be assessed more throughly elsewhere. Mustafa Akdağ (1913 Akdağ ( -1973 , a prominent economic historian and politically a left-leaning Kemalist, pursued a neo-Köprülüan approach in his historical methodology, but rather than documenting a medieval feudalism, Akdağ sought to under disguise of "scientific" Marxism, not unlike Engels' romanticization of Germans influenced by Tacitus' Germania. Whereas, as argued in this study, the Kemalist passion for freedom-loving nomadic warriorism had been abandoned in favor of the image of strong and efficient state, the leftist-Kemalist Avcıoğlu attributed socialist overtones to the alleged egalitarianism of preOttoman Anatolian nomads. He was also highly influenced by Fuad Köprülü, whom he merged with Friedrich Engels in accordance with his merging of socialist convictions with Kemalist premises (Avcıoğlu 1983, v. I) . For Tacitus and his impact on 19 th-century historiography in general and Engels in particular see Mellor (1994) ; Mellor (1999: 76-109) . 
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